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BI-LEVEL EVIDENTIALISM AND 
REFORMED APOLOGETICS 
Michael L. Czapkay Sudduth 
In this paper I apply William Alston's "epistemic level distinctions" to the 
debate between evidentialist and anti-evidentialist approaches to Christian 
apologetics in the Reformed tradition. I first clarify the nature of this debate 
by showing that it rests fundamentally on a tension between the desire to 
have a comprehensive Christian apologetic and the belief that the Holy Spirit 
plays a special epistemic role in belief-formation, such that certain beliefs 
are formed and justified by conditions unique to Christian religious experi-
ence. Secondly, I argue that even if S's belief that p is immediately justified 
(through such privileged modes of belief-formation), (I) an evidentialist 
requirement can be placed on the higher-level belief that P* (p is immediately 
justified) and (2) apologetics can draw on the reasons which confer justifi-
cation on P*, thereby providing indirect support for p. 
During the last ten years, a plethora of articles has been written on what is 
now called Reformed epistemology. A fairly large portion of these essays (and 
books) have involved explicating, examining, and elucidating the Reformed 
view on faith and reason within the context of contemporary epistemology. 
A somewhat neglected area, though, has been the application of developments 
in Reformed epistemology to the field of apologetics in the Reformed tradi-
tion, where both evidentialist and anti-evidentialist or presuppositionalist 
approaches to apologetics have been taken by Reformed thinkers in the 20th 
century. Although the debate between Reformed evidentialism and presupposi-
tionalism includes the question of the propriety of the theistic arguments, it will 
be clear in this paper that the more fundamental issues involve the nature of 
apologetics and the epistemic function of the Holy Spirit in belief-formation. In 
the present paper I will draw upon William Alston's notion of "epistemic level 
distinctions" to clarify the nature of the Reformed apologetic debate and provide 
a plausible solution to the stalemate between evidentialism and presupposi-
tionalism. My ultimate objective here is to employ Alston's multi-level foun-
dationalism to construct an alternative apologetic system which subsumes the 
elements of positive value in both presuppositionalism and evidentialism 
while avoiding their respective errors.i I call this meta-apologetic theory, 
which combines immediately justified Christian beliefs with the evidentialist 
demand for adequate reasons, Bi-Level Evidentialism. 
FAITH AND PHILOSOPHY 
Vol. 11 No.3 July 1994 
All rights reserved. 
379 
380 Faith and Philosophy 
I. Evidentialism and Evidentialist Apologetics 
With Alvin Plantinga and Nicholas Wolterstorff, I take it that evidentialist 
apologetics began as a response to the evidentialist challenge to theistic belief 
which originated out of the Enlightenment. 2 This challenge may be stated in 
two propositions. 
(1) A person S is rational in believing that Pt (where Pt = the proposition 
God exists) only if S's belief that Pt is based upon adequate reasons. 
(2) There are no adequate reasons for the belief that Pt. 
Although it is possible to construe something like (1) within a coherentist 
framework of rational belief, for the purpose of this paper I will take the 
evidentialist challenge to be rooted in classical foundationalism. Accordingly, 
although some beliefs are rational by virtue of their relation to other rational 
beliefs (by being based upon beliefs which provide adequate evidential sup-
port for them), these non-basic beliefs ultimately terminate (via a based-upon 
relation) in foundational beliefs (properly basic beliefs) which are rational 
even though they are not based upon some other (rational) belief(s). More-
over, a belief is properly basic if and only if it is either (a) self-evident, (b) 
immediately about one's experience, or (c) evident to the senses. So con-
strued, the evidentialist challenge holds that since belief in God fulfills none 
of the criteria (a)-(c) for proper basicality, theistic belief is rational only if it 
can be adequately supported by some other rational beliefs, which terminate 
(proximately or remotely) in beliefs which are properly basic. But there are 
no such reasons that provide adequate support for theistic belief; therefore, 
theistic belief is irrational. 
But what does it mean to have an irrational (or rational) belief? As has been 
pointed out by several writers, the concept of rationality is pluriform, and the 
matter is further complicated by a disagreement amongst epistemologists on 
the relationship between the concept of rationality and the closely related 
notions of "justification" and "warrant." There are two senses of rationality, 
though, which are important to distinguish. By "rational" one may mean 
"violates no intellectual duty." This deontological view is found in Alvin 
Plantinga's "Reason and Belief in God" (1983) where the evidentialist chal-
lenge is taken primarily in deontological terms, and it is argued (contra (1) 
that one may believe in God without evidence and yet not be violating any 
intellectual duties. 3 However, there is widespread agreement amongst 
epistemologists that one may satisfy the conditions of deontological justifi-
cation without satisfying other epistemic desiderata, such as truth or knowl-
edge.4 Now, on the one hand, this is not problematic, for it is an axiom (or 
nearly so) in epistemology that a justified belief may be false (and therefore 
not knowledge). But there is another sense of rationality which is stronger 
than deontological rationality with respect to the cognitive aim at truth. There 
Bf-LEVEL EVIDENTlALlSM AND REFORMED APOLOGETICS 381 
is what we can call truth-conducive rationality.s According to this concept of 
rationality, a rational belief is one that would put an individual in a good 
position vis-a-vis the cognitive aim at truth (where the deontological concept 
fails to satisfy this condition). The constraint of truth-conducivity requires 
that a person believe that p in such a way (or on such a basis) that it is at 
least very likely that p is true. In the long run, this would translate into the 
satisfaction of a more general epistemic desideratum: maximizing truth and 
minimizing falsity in our believings. Hence, although the evidentialist chal-
lenge may be construed in terms of deontological rationality, it may also be 
construed in terms of truth-conducive rationality. On the latter construal, the 
theist who believes in God without having or grounding that belief in ade-
quate propositional evidence does not necessarily violate something like an 
intellectual duty, but is simply in a poor position with respect to the cognitive 
aim of truth.6 In this paper, I will be speaking in terms of "justified" belief, 
where justification is truth-conducive (and the use of "rationality" should be 
taken as synonomous with, or as an up-shot of, truth-conducive justification).7 
In response to the evidentialist challenge which maintained that there is no 
sufficient evidence for theistic belief, several philosophers and theologians 
have (contra (2» sought to provide evidence for belief in God in order to 
establish it as a justified belief. This project of answering the Enlightenment 
challenge by adducing evidence for belief in God (where that evidence is 
presented in arguments which are either deductive or inductive in form) is 
evidentialist apologetics-the attempt to defend the faith by presenting posi-
tive arguments in favor of belief in God. However, if we view the develop-
ment of evidentialist apologetics as a response to the Enlightenment challenge 
to theistic belief, then there are two different epistemic principles upon which 
evidentialist apologetics can proceed. 
Evidentialist apologetics would follow from (1) if and only if (1) was 
conjoined with 
(3) S believes that there is adequate evidence for theistic belief. 
An apologist, then, might accept the epistemological thesis of the Enlight-
enment that theistic belief is justified only if it is based upon adequate rea-
sons, but also hold that there is sufficient evidence for theistic belief. 
Therefore, he would proceed on the assumption that belief in God without 
sufficient evidence is always irrational. We can call this Strong Evidential-
ism (hereafter, Es), since it maintains that adequate reasons are necessary for 
justified belief in God. Es-based apologetics accepts (1), but then, on the basis 
of (3), proceeds to argue that theistic belief can be supported by evidence, 
and that such evidence is sufficient and hence shows theistic belief to be 
rational. But a commitment to evidentialist apologetics need not involve an 
acceptance of (1). It could follow from (3) alone. An apologist might attempt 
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to supply theistic evidences simply because he believes that they do in fact 
exist (and are necessary for apologetics), not because he accepts the Enlight-
enment principle that theistic belief requires such evidence in order to be 
rational. So evidentialist apologetics can be based upon the epistemological 
thesis that evidence is a sufficient condition for rational belief. In other terms, 
an apologist might believe that belief in God can be rational (in some sense) 
without evidence, but nevertheless there is evidence for God's existence 
which should be adduced in apologetics. One may endorse and use theistic 
proofs or arguments in apologetics, but not hold that such evidences are 
necessary for a person to have a rational belief in God. We can caB this 
version of evidential ism Modest Evidentialism (hereafter Em) and its apolo-
getic application Em-based apologetics. 
II. Reformed Apologetics 
The history of Reformed theology has displayed a certain degree of ambiva-
lence over the role of evidences in the justification of theistic belief. This 
ambivalence is most perspicuous in late 19th- and 20th-century Reformed 
apologetics,S where two schools of thought, Reformed evidentialism and 
presuppositonalism, have taken two quite distinct approaches to Christian 
apologetics. Presuppositionalism, based upon the work of the 19th-century 
Amsterdam theologian and philosopher Abraham Kuyper, has as its central 
characteristics the rejection of arguments for the existence of God and an 
emphasis upon taking belief in the God of Scripture as the starting point for 
every dimension of human life. Presuppositionalists (such as Herman Bav-
inck, Cornelius Van Til, and Gordon Clark) have argued that belief in both 
God and Scripture is an epistemically appropriate starting-point for the be-
liever. Kuyper and Clark both press the point that every system of thought 
rests upon presuppositions, and every act of demonstration must terminate in 
first principles. Since ultimate premises are appropriately argued/rom, never 
to, there is no need to prove the existence of God or that Scripture is His 
Word. Moreover, since these beliefs are produced by the inward work of the 
Holy Spirit in regeneration, it is futile to adduce arguments for theistic or 
Christian belief in apologetics. Reformed evidentialists (such as Jonathan 
Edwards, Charles Hodge, and B.B Warfield), on the other hand, have gener-
ally not questioned the plausibility of taking theistic belief as a first principle, 
but they have questioned the inference from this that such principles should 
never be argued for. They have recognized that intuitive truths can also be 
discursively established, and that in apologetics one must reason back to 
theological first principles, not from them (as is appropriate in theology). 
Therefore, arguments for the existence of God and other Christian doctrines 
may be (and must be) used in apologetics. 
As a starting point, I suggest that the debate between these two apologetic 
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schools be considered in the light of the epistemological distinction drawn 
above between Es and Em. Both presuppositionalism and Reformed eviden-
tialism have at least one thing in common-both would deny (1). As Plantinga 
has argued, a basic principle of the Reformed tradition is the proper basicality 
or immediate justification of theistic belief (where a belief is justified by 
virtue of something other than some relation that belief has to some other 
justified beliefs). Hence the Reformed theologian would be committed in 
principle to rejecting deontological and truth-conducive versions of Es. Both 
presuppositionalists and Reformed evidentialists agree that, insofar as the 
believer is concerned, theistic belief can be immediately justified.9 The point 
at issue concerns the possibility of a mediately justified theistic belief and its 
place in apologetics, for if theistic belief can be mediately justified, then the 
reasons which confer such justification can be presented in apologetics. 
If we concentrate solely on the Reformed tradition's commitment to the 
immediate justification of theistic belief (a theme heavily emphasized in the 
presuppositionalist's camp), it certainly seems that Em is compatible with 
both Reformed evidentialism and presuppositionalism. If the Reformed po-
sition is committed to the epistemological thesis that belief in God can be 
justified for some person S without S basing that belief upon adequate rea-
sons, it does not follow that there are no adequate reasons for such a belief, 
reasons which could be adduced in apologetics or which could even form a 
sufficient basis for a rational belief in God for someone. Put more technically, 
if S's belief in God can be immediately justified, why should this necessarily 
rule out the possibility of that very belief also being susceptible to a mediate 
justification? After all, one sufficient condition does not logically rule out 
the possibility of another. 
One may take an analogy here from the belief "It is raining outside." One 
may form this belief on the basis of a particular sensory experience, say by 
just looking out the window. In such an instance the person would be appeared 
to rainly, and the belief that it is raining outside would be immediately 
justified on the grounds of sensory experience (assuming, of course, that the 
sensory experience can function as an adequate ground). Take another situ-
ation though. A person may be locked in a room without windows, but nev-
ertheless has access to a certain body of auditory evidence. This person cannot 
see the rain falling down, nor can he run outside and feel the raindrops falling 
on his head. But he hears a series of rolls of thunder, a prolonged period of 
pitter-patter on the roof, and then someone walks in with a raincoat and 
umbrella soaked with water. We might add to this a certain set of background 
beliefs about what generally accompanies thunder and so on. The person con-
cludes, based upon these evidences, that it is (or has just been) raining outside. 
The possibility that this was a cruel experiment conducted by an epistemologist 
(complete with sound effects and an actor with a raincoat just sprayed down 
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with a garden hose) notwithstanding, it is reasonable to see how one might 
conclude with a very high degree of probability that it is raining outside. The 
belief in question, then, can either be immediately justified on the grounds 
of sensory perceptual experience or mediately justified on the grounds of 
adequate reasons. Of course, such a justification would only be prima facie, 
since it would be subject to being overridden by sufficient reasons to the 
contrary. But until then, the belief in question is prima facie justified. 
Similarly, theistic belief might be a candidate for immediate justification 
(e.g., by being based upon the grounds of religious experience) and also find 
sufficient conditions for justification in other justified beliefs. An apologetic 
method based upon a modest evidentialism of this sort would be prima facie 
compatible with Reformed theology since it allows for an immediately justi-
fied belief in God. But, since it equally allows for a mediately justified 
theistic belief, it would be able to make use of the reasons which produce 
such ajustification. Hence, by adducing arguments which contain the relevant 
evidences, apologetics would be devoted to providing reasons for theistic 
belief, though this would in no way reflect the grounds upon which the 
Christian ought to believe. The only requirement would be that theistic belief 
be subject to both an immediate and mediate justification, and-as we have 
just seen-this is most plausible on epistemological grounds. Moreover, it is 
supported historically by the endorsement of theistic arguments by theologi-
ans in the Reformed tradition. \0 The Old School Calvinist William Shedd, 
though emphasizing the fact that belief in the existence of God is an intuitive 
first principle (and as such is given immediately to human consciousness), 
says that "certain syllogistic arguments have been constructed ... [which] (1) 
assist the development of the idea of God, and contain a scientific analysis 
of man's natural consciousness of the deity ... [and] (2) reply to the counter-
arguments of materialism and atheism."!! Similarly, Charles Hodge main-
tained that belief in God is among those "certain truths which the mind 
perceives to be true immediately, without proof or testimony," but he was 
critical of those theologians and philosophers who inferred from this that the 
existence of God could not be proved. That there is "an extra-mundane and 
eternal being," and that "he is a personal Being, self-conscious, intelligent, 
and moral. .. may lie inclosed in primary intuition, but it needs to be brought 
out and established."12 The Calvinistic Baptist Augustus Strong wrote: "Al-
though the knowledge of God's existence is intuitive, it may be explicated 
and confirmed by arguments drawn from the actual universe and from the 
abstract ideas of the human mind."13 
III. The Dilemma of Presuppositionalist Apologetics 
In the Reformed tradition, however, there seems to be a problem, and the 
problem arises in the presuppositionalist camp. The preceding conclusion 
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implies that belief in God can be formed on some basis other than the inner 
testimony of the Holy Spirit, that there are reasons (to which the unregenerate 
person has access) which entail (or render probable) the existence of God. 
Presuppositionalists, though, have argued that it is the testimonium Spiritus 
Sancti that enables the Christian to see immediately (without any reasons) 
the truth of God's existence and Scripture as a revelation from Him. Now 
admittedly this is complicated by a certain degree of vacillation among pre-
suppositionalists as to whether it is the belief that God exists that is produced 
by the Spirit or whether it is the certainty that He exists which is produced 
by the Spirit. Calvin makes several statements to the effect that it is the 
"certainty which piety requires" and "firm faith in Scripture" which is pro-
duced by the Spirit and cannot be established by argumentation, and he 
suggests the same for belief in God. 14 Abraham Kuyper, the father of presup-
positional ism, understood the act of faith to be "that function of the soul...by 
which it obtains certainty directly and immediately, without the aid of dis-
cursive demonstration."ls Again, he speaks of faith in its "formal sense" as 
"a firm conviction," which "is not the outcome of observation or demonstra-
tion."16 Herman Bavinck, after stating that we are deeply convinced of the 
external world, the self, and moral law without proofs or argumentation, and 
that belief in God is of a similar class, says, "The so-called proofs may convey 
greater clearness, [but] they are by no means the final grounds of our most 
certain conviction that God exists. This certainty is established only by 
faith."17 But, if to believe that p is to take it that p is more probable than 
not-p (or some alternative q),18 then "certainty" would not be a necessary 
component to "belief," and one should appropriately distinguish "belief that 
God exists" from "faith in God," where "faith" is taken to entail "certainty." 
Otherwise one is just confusing terms. And it does seem that there are many 
cases of religious belief which do not entail "certainty." The references above 
suggest that we should distinguish belief that God exists from a "certain" 
conviction that he exists. So perhaps the Spirit produces the element of 
"certainty" in religious belief. And even if one maintains that the Spirit 
produces both the belief and the certainty, this still leaves open the possibility 
that something else (reasons) can produce the belief, even if one is not certain 
about p. In this way, an argument which showed that God's existence was 
more probable than not might lead to belief, though not faith. 
The theologian in the Kuyperian tradition might respond, "But after all it 
is not belief in the true God." And that will inevitably be the presupposition-
alist's response. The saying of Pascal is well known: "God of Abraham, Isaac, 
and Jacob, not of the philosophers and scholars." Calvin himself emphasized 
that, though the knowledge of God is innate, we lack "the natural ability to 
mount up unto the pure and clear knowledge of God"19 and that "Scripture, 
gathering up the otherwise confused knowledge of God in our minds ... clearly 
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shows us the true God,"20 not merely as the Creator but as the Redeemer. 
Similar sentiments can be found in the writings of Kuyper, Bavinck, Van Til, 
and Clark. I rather suspect, then, that the definition of God as "a person 
without a body who is eternal, is perfectly free, omnipotent, omniscient, 
perfectly good, and the creator of all things"21 would not satisfy the presup-
positionalist, since this definition expresses a fundamental conception of 
Deity common to Christianity, Judaism, and Islam. That there are strong 
arguments for the existence of a God defined in these terms, which might 
produce belief that such a God exists, would not impress the presupposition-
alist. Although the Reformed theologian (including the presuppositionalist) 
would agree that a general theistic belief can be formed on some basis other 
than the inward work of the Spirit, he would also emphasize that belief in 
the God of Scripture (Christian theism in particular) requires special revela-
tion, and belief in that revelation may not be possible without the illumination 
of the Spirit. 
This has brought us to what is perhaps the crux of the problem in presup-
positionalist apologetics-the domain of the class of beliefs targeted in the 
apologetic task and the epistemic function of the Holy Spirit in belief forma-
tion relative to these beliefs. Up to this point we have focused on theistic 
belief (Pt) as the domain of apologetics, rather than the broader category of 
Christian belief (Pc, where Pc entails Pt-though obviously not the con-
verse). Presuppositionalists, though, have insisted that Christian apologetics 
must be concerned with more than the attempt to argue for a minimal theism. 
The apologetic task must be concerned with Pc-beliefs.22 The central issues 
of the philosophy of religion have been questions concerning the nature of 
God, the meaningfulness of religious language, and the rationality of belief 
in God. Only recently has the philosophy of religion taken up questions 
relating to the more specific religious claims, but this is still very much 
uncharted territory.23 In the philosophy of religion general religious claims 
and beliefs have been central, not the more specifically Christian claims. So, 
even if theistic belief could be formed on some basis other than the testimony 
of the Holy Spirit, we would still be left with the question as to whether belief 
in the several other central, and not so central, Christian doctrines could be 
so formed. I think that the Reformed theologian is committed to believing 
that among Pc-beliefs there are at least some Christian propositions belief in 
which requires the inner testimony of the Spirit.24 Let us call this special 
subset of Pc-beliefs, privileged epistemic state beliefs (PES-beliefs) [Not to 
be confused with the notion of privileged access to one's own mental states]. 
PES-beliefs would be Pc-beliefs that require for their formation and justifi-
cation epistemic conditions unique to the Christian. This could be cast in 
terms of belief formation on the grounds of a distinctly Christian religious 
experience and doxastic practice (as developed recently by William Alston 
in Perceiving God) or in terms of the proper functioning of special belief-
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forming mechanisms (subject to the various additional Plantingian "warrant" 
constraints).25 The essential point is that the justifiers of such beliefs would 
at least include grounds or epistemic conditions unique to the mental life of 
the person indwelt by the Holy Spirit.26 
I would suggest that it is this conclusion that brings the project of Reformed 
apologetics to a serious impasse. Apologetics has as its objective showing 
that Christian beliefs or the Christian system of belief possesses some positive 
epistemic status. The concept of showing, though, clearly entails discursive 
or mediate justification. To show that p I must adduce other beliefs in support 
of p. These other beliefs must be justified and such that they constitute 
adequate reasons for p. Moreover, since showing is an audience-relative 
concept, the reasons must be acceptable to the audience. Now, if we restrict 
ourselves to theistic belief (as Reformed evidentialists have tended to do), 
the reasons are available. But what if we extend the set of beliefs targeted in 
apologetics to PES-beliefs, the formation of which require epistemic condi-
tions to which only the Christian has access? And what if there is no good 
argument from Pt to PES-beliefs? This is like having an intuitive first prin-
ciple which can only be seen intuitively by a certain class of people and which 
refuses (purely) discursive support in order to be shown to others. How, then, 
can the Reformed apologist defend the rationality of a class of beliefs which 
are formed on the basis of a Christian religious experience and subject only 
to an immediate justification? More generally, how can beliefs that is formed 
and justified by privileged modes (immediate or mediate) of belief formation 
be shown to possess an epistemic status which they have by virtue of condi-
tions which (at least) include those privileged epistemic conditions? This is 
the dilemma of presuppositionalist apologetics. 
IV. Epistemic Level Distinctions and Bi-Level Evidentialism 
Faced with the above dilemma, presuppositionalists have turned to negative 
apologetics-answering objections made against Christianity. This has 
largely amounted to showing that such and such Christian belief is rational 
because coherent, or that some set of Christian doctrines is rational because 
self-consistent. After all, even if one cannot show that some set of proposi-
tions is true, one can show that they are self-consistent. Even if one cannot 
show that the Christian God exists, certainly one can show that it is a coherent 
belief. Unfortunately, a system may be entirely self-consistent, and yet pos-
sesses more false propositions than true ones, even all false propositions. 
Coherence is not a truth-conducive mode of justification. Taken by itself, it 
is a poor epistemological basis on which to launch a Christian apologetic. 
There is, however, another epistemological move that can be made along 
foundationalist lines, which would provide a solid basis for a form of positive 
apologetics. 
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The problem with presuppositionalism in apologetics is really a problem 
with an aspect of foundationalism in epistemology. Correctly recognizing that 
all mediate justification must terminate with beliefs which are immediately 
justified, presuppositionalists have argued that if that is where the justifica-
tion stops, the epistemological buck stops there. To avoid an infinite regress 
of demonstrations, one must terminate justification in first principles or basic 
beliefs. Unfortunately, this fundamental reason for adopting foundationalism 
is also the major reason why some have avoided it. It seems to end up in 
arbitrary dogmatism, for-it is argued-the foundationalist is committed to 
accepting beliefs for no reason whatsoever. In fact, presuppositionalists in 
Reformed apologetics have often come across this way. They disavow any 
attempt to give reasons for their first principles, for the foundations. They 
seem to be committed to adopting beliefs in the absence of all evidence. 
I believe that the way of escape here is to introduce the notion of "epistemic 
level distinctions," a theme which figures prominently in the epistemology 
of William Alston.27 Given any putative belief that p, we may distinguish 
between the belief that p and various higher-level doxastic correlates of p, 
the candidates for which would include S's belief that: (a) p is a rational 
belief, (b) p is immediately justified, (c) p was formed in a reliable manner, 
or (d) p is based upon adequate grounds. Among other things, this allows us 
to distinguish between a belief that p and a higher-level belief about the 
epistemic status of p (call the higher level belief "the belief that P*"). This 
in turn makes possible the assessment of any belief (even an immediately 
justified belief) in terms of reasons, for where a belief that p is immediately 
justified, it is possible (in principle) to find reasons for the higher-level belief 
that p is immediately justified. So even if the belief that p is immediately 
justified, the belief that p* (p is immediately justified) can be mediately 
justified. Therefore, if a lower-level belief that p can only be immediately 
justified, it does not follow that p cannot be assessed in terms of reasons. 
Even if one is restricted to immediate justification on the lower level for the 
belief that p, one may adduce reasons at the higher level for the belief that 
P*. We can call these reasons meta-reasons, since they are reasons for re-
garding the belief that p as immediately justified. These reasons would be 
something like p possesses some property Q and possessing Q renders p 
justified; that is to say, meta-reasons concern whether there is a valid 
epistemic principle and whether the belief in question (by virtue of possessing 
the appropriate justification-making property) falls under that principle. Hence, 
the absence of reasons at the lower-level can be compensated for by reasons 
which are adduced at the higher level. The belief that p is immediately justified, 
while the correlative epistemic belief of p (P*) is mediately justified. 
In "Two Types of Foundationalism," William Alston explains this level 
distinction in the following terms: 
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Though the simple foundationalist requires some immediately justified be-
liefs in order to terminate the regress of justification, his position permits 
him to recognize that all epistemic beliefs require mediate justification. 
Therefore, for any belief that one is immediately justified in believing, one 
may find adequate reasons for accepting the proposition that one is so justi-
fied. The curse (of dogmatism) is taken off immediate justification at the 
lower level, just by virtue of the fact that propositions at the higher level are 
acceptable only on the basis of reasons. A foundational belief, b, is immedi-
ately justified just because some valid epistemic principle lays down condi-
tions for its being justified which do not include the believer having certain 
other justified beliefs. But the believer will be justified in believing that he 
is immediately justified in holding b only if he has reasons for regarding that 
principle as valid and regarding b as falling under that principle. And if he 
does have such reasons, he certainly cannot be accused of arbitrariness or 
dogmatism in accepting b.28 
Hence, we may formulate the principle of the higher-level evidentialist 
option: 
(4) Given any person S, if S's belief that p is immediately justified, then S's 
belief that P* (p is immediately justified) may be mediately justified. 
Applied to our present inquiry two general consequences follow from this 
multi-level epistemology. The apparatus of epistemic level distinctions allows 
us to distinguish between the belief that Pt (God exists) and the belief that 
Pt* (Pt is justified). Even if S's belief that Pt is immediately justified, it is 
possible to ascend a level and raise the question regarding the epistemic status 
of the belief that God exists, to consider (reasons for) the higher-level propo-
sition S's belief that Pt is immediately justified. This move will become all 
the more important if we consider the problematic PES-beliefs discussed 
above. There we stipulated that PES-beliefs are beliefs formed under 
epistemic conditions unique to the Christian. Our primary targets were basic 
or immediate PES-beliefs (e.g., beliefs based upon Christian religious expe-
rience), the necessary justificatory conditions of which include (non-doxas-
tic) grounds to which only the person indwelt by the Holy Spirit has cognitive 
access, the up-shot of which is that such PES-beliefs are subject only to an 
immediate justification. Clearly, though, if we distinguish between PES-be-
liefs and PES* -beliefs (i.e., beliefs about the epistemic status of PES-beliefs), 
then even if the justificatory conditions (whether immediate or mediate) of 
PES-beliefs are in some way privileged (such that only the Christian has 
access to them), the justificatory conditions of the higher-level epistemic 
correlates of PES-beliefs need not be privileged in that way. So even if a 
PES-belief is restricted to a form of justification which is privileged and 
immediate, the PES-belief can still be assessed in terms of reasons which are 
accessible to the non-Christian, for she may consider the reasons for the 
PES-belief's higher-level correlate PES*. Even where S's PES-belief is 
solely immediately justified, the correlative higher-level belief that S's PES-
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belief is (solely) immediately justified may be mediately justified by being 
based upon accessible adequate reasons. And even where the target PES-be-
lief is formed and justified by a privileged mediate mode of belief formation 
(such that the doxastic grounds for the PES-belief are only seen by the 
Christian) one can always raise the higher-level question and seek accessible 
reasons for the belief that S's PES-belief is mediately justified. Now I empha-
size the accessibility element because the types of reasons or beliefs that are 
envisaged here as the grounds for PES*-beliefs are-as already pointed out-
beliefs as to what principles of epistemic justification are valid and whether 
the target PES-belief can be validly subsumed under any of these principles. 
The formation and justification of such beliefs hardly seems a matter to be 
restricted to the cognitive life of the Christian. 
Secondly, this distinction between various epistemic levels also allows us 
to incorporate a strong version of evidential ism. The distinction between 
epistemic levels entails that there are actually (at least) two distinct levels on 
which the evidentialist requirement for reasons may operate. There is a lower-
level evidentialist requirement which requires for the justification of any 
putative belief that p that p be based upon adequate reasons, and there is a 
higher-level evidentialist requirement which requires adequate reasons for 
the justification of any higher-level correlate of a putative belief that p. Alston 
argues that if an epistemic belief is justified, it is mediately justified. Higher-
level beliefs about the epistemic status of lower-level correlates are evalu-
ative in nature, but all such evaluation involves supervenient properties, and 
the application of such properties will invariably be based upon more funda-
mental properties. If S is immediately justified in some belief that p this is 
because there is a valid epistemic principle which lays down conditions for 
the belief's being justified which do not include the possession of other 
beliefs. If S is to be justified in the belief that P* (S's belief that p is 
immediately justified), then S must have reasons for regarding such a prin-
ciple as valid and for regarding p as appropriately falling under the principle. 
In other terms, S is justified in believing that S's belief that p is immediately 
justified (if and) only if S is justified in believing that p possesses some 
property Q (a so-called "warrant increasing property") and that any belief 
that possesses Q is immediately justified.29 
As I have argued, Es (strong evidentialism) is incompatible with Reformed 
theology since it rules out immediately justified theistic beliefs, and Em 
(modest evidentialism) is compatible with Reformed thought by virtue of 
leaving room for basic beliefs. However, now that we have introduced higher-
level beliefs, we can modify our previous conclusion. All that was established 
earlier was that, since-for the Reformed theologian-theistic belief (and 
some Pc-beliefs) are immediately justified, basing such beliefs upon adequate 
evidence cannot be a necessary condition for their justification. Conse-
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quently, Es was rejected with respect to lower-level beliefs. The situation is 
different at the higher level. Here we may maintain that higher-level beliefs 
always require adequate reasons for their justification. What we have found 
in the Reformed tradition is an emphasis upon immediately justified beliefs 
at the lower-level. From this follows only the rejection oflower-Ievel Es. This 
leaves open the possibility of advocating Es on the higher level with respect 
to all epistemic beliefs.30 We may, therefore, lay down the principle of the 
higher-level evidentialist requirement: 
(5) Given any belief that p, p's correlative higher-level epistemic belief that 
P* is justified only ifP* is based upon adequate reasons.31 
The preceding epistemology, then, gives us the following statement on the 
justification of Christian beliefs, what I call Bi-Level Evidentialism (which 
conjoins both lower-level Em and higher-level Es).32 
(6) Given any person S, if S's belief that Pc (where Pc = any Christian 
belief) is either (a) immediately justified, (b) mediately justified, or (c) 
both [(a) and (b»), and if p is either (a) or (b) then the correlative 
epistemic belief that Pc* is justified only if Pc* is based upon adequate 
reasons. 
The foregoing epistemology of religious belief allows for a far richer 
framework for Christian apologetics than has been previously taken up by 
Reformed apologists, and one which goes considerable distance toward over-
coming the stalemate between the Reformed evidentialists and presupposi-
tionalists. It follows from the argument of the previous section that the 
activity of justifying Christian belief(s) can take place on anyone of many 
epistemic levels. The dominant tradition in Christian apologetics has been 
what we might call lower-level positive apologetics-the attempt to justify 
various religious beliefs and/or theological propositions (which are 
nonepistemic) by an appeal to other nonepistemic beliefs. I will call this the 
L-justifying of beliefs ("L" referring to the "lower-level" from which the 
support is drawn). Alternatively, Bi-Level Evidentialism opens up the pros-
pects for higher-level positive apologetics. Here some putative Christian 
belief that Pc is supported by the activity of justifying the correlative higher-
level belief that Pc*, what we can call the method of H-justifying. So, for 
example, where S's belief that Pc is immediately justified, one may adduce 
the appropriate reasons for regarding (the higher-level proposition) Pc is 
immediately justified as justified. This method extends the scope of apolo-
getics to cover a wide range of Christian beliefs which hitherto could not (or 
at least not readily) be assessed in terms of reasons. 
The relevance of H-justifying to apologetics is determined by the apolo-
getic relevance of meta-reasons, and apologetic relevance is conditioned by 
"epistemic" and/or "alethic" relevance, for the apologist is engaged in the 
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two-fold objective of trying to establish the rationality and truth of Christian 
belief(s). Higher-level beliefs that are about the epistemic status of their 
lower-level correlates are directly epistemically relevant and hence provide 
a kind of direct support for the belief's epistemic status. But if the epistemic 
status is truth-conducive (as our concept of justification has been), then a 
belief's epistemic status is indirectly relevant to its alethic status, and there-
fore establishing the former provides indirect support for the latter. In other 
terms, although we begin by targeting an epistemic belief by considering 
reasons for Pt* (or, more broadly, any Christian belief Pc*), this procedure 
ends up providing reasons for Pt (or PC).33 In this way we can call H-justi-
fying a mode of indirect support for Pt (or Pc), for the activity of justifying 
the lower-level belief that Pt (or Pc) is mediated by the activity of justifying 
the higher-level belief that Pt* (or PC*).34 
V. Conclusion 
At the beginning of the paper we saw that the belief that there is adequate 
evidence for the existence of God is sufficient for launching the project of 
evidentialist apologetic (whether or not one also buys into the evidentialist 
principle that the rationality of theistic belief requires propositional support). 
Reasons may be essential to justifying theistic belief (via apologetics), even 
if not necessary for a person's being epistemically justified in believing in 
God. What evidentialist apologetics depends upon, of course, is the possibil-
ity of a mediate justification of the target belief and the ability to adduce 
those reasons. In the light of this, I suggested that the difficulty in Reformed 
apologetics was not fundamentally a disagreement about the possibility of a 
mediately justified theistic belief (as this is quite compatible with an imme-
diately justified theistic belief), but rather the dilemma of Reformed apolo-
getics is generated by (1) the desire to have a more comprehensive Christian 
apologetic and (2) the belief that the Holy Spirit has a special epistemic 
function in the production of certain Christian beliefs, leading to privileged 
epistemic state beliefs. 
Drawing upon William Alston's multi-level foundationalism I have argued 
two points. First an epistemological claim: even where a putative belief that 
Pc is immediately justified, it is possible (in principle) to find reasons for 
regarding the belief as immediately justified. Moreover, an evidentialist re-
quirement for being justified in all such higher-level beliefs would be com-
patible with the immediate justification of beliefs at the lower level. 
Secondly, I applied this bi-level scheme to Reformed apologetics, specifically 
to the debate between evidentialist and presuppositionalist schools. The 
higher-level evidentialist option makes possible a more comprehensive Chris-
tian apologetic, for we may adduce reasons for Pc by justifying Pc's higher-
level epistemic correlate Pc*, a most important move where the target beliefs 
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are PES-beliefs, beliefs formed on the grounds of religious experience or 
some other privileged epistemic condition(s). Bi-Level Evidentialism allows 
the Reformed thinker to enter into the task of "giving a reason for the hope 
that is within him," even when that hope is a product of, what John Calvin 
called, the testimonium Spiritus Sancti. 35 
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